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"The battle with rigid Protestantism and the final discomfiture of the enlightened rationalists a hundred years ago were the necessary preliminaries to the rediscovery of the Middle Ages; but the memory of these historic struggles does not justify the appropriation of mediæval religion by any modern party or the repudiation of it by any other. For the mediæval Church is the mother of us all."

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IDEALISM AND THE MODERN AGE. GEORGE P. ADAMS. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. ix, 253. \$2.50.

Professor Adams finds that modern democracy needs correction by a religious attitude, a devotion to certain objective ideals quite in the Platonic spirit. The gospel of self-assertion, which in our day has led to the extremes of capitalism and pragmatism, should be replaced by the ideal of the "Great Community." For democracy is the doctrine of the "will to power," the apotheosis of "activity and control," "the conscious conviction that the only social order fit for man to live in is one which he himself has made and can control — and which he can unmake if he so desires. This conviction is but democracy come to a full consciousness of its meaning and its power" (p. 7). On the other hand, "Idealism in philosophy *should* connote a wide understanding of and a generous sympathy for the forces — primarily those of common life and labor — which are rapidly gathering strength to challenge the arbitrary 'will to power' lying at the root of so much within the established order" (p. viii). In fact, by democracy Dr. Adams understands a more or less Nietzschean individualism, and by idealism a belief in the social organism — interpretations which seem decidedly questionable when we remember that Germany stood for the former, that current democracy particularly emphasizes the needs of "common life and labor," and that the founder of idealism did not believe in the social organism. Yet though it is not democracy but self-assertiveness that he is arraigning, he does sincerely and properly attempt to restore a lost balance; and allowing for his strange misuse of terms, we must heartily commend the enterprise.

Religion and idealism, if not one and the same, are for our author closely allied. "At its source religion is the felt participation of the individual in a collective consciousness. . . . The vehicle of group emotion, the source and stuff of that which was sacred and supernatural, was no personal god or spirit, but . . . a 'social force trembling on the verge of Godhead'" (p. 51). And Platonism, with its contemplation of the eternal ideas, is "the spokesman for something

which can only go by the name of religion" (p. 11). Over against these Dr. Adams arrays the present-day naturalism, with its Darwinian struggle for existence, its scientific control of nature, its world "to be controlled, to be made and remade . . . in order that our active human interests and impulses shall find release and satisfaction" (p. 10). Tracing the growth of this democratic spirit, he finds it characterized by increasing emphasis on business for its own sake and mechanical efficiency, and by a decreasing valuation of personality. "Democracy, economic rationalism, science, . . . bid us incessantly create, make our world, and all the objects of value which it shall contain" (p. 87). "Behaviorism and pragmatic instrumentalism are philosophies of an age which no longer has significant structures to possess, to contemplate and to enjoy. . . . Pragmatism is the intellectual form of modern capitalism" (p. 112). The subjectivism of modern philosophy, from Kant on, marks the same accentuation of man's activity. "The Kantian insight sums up a world of activity and democracy" (p. 163). Dr. Adams, true to the Platonic tradition, is an epistemological realist. "Consciousness of reality is as much inalienable and elemental as is consciousness of self" (p. 123). The subjective philosophies have but a subjective origin; the economic interpretation of history is only the reflection of the economic bias of the present age (pp. 136, 137). Not only does pragmatism rest upon a realistic basis, to wit, the science of biology, but if pragmatism is true, "there is no intrinsic meaning or value possessed by any one period of time in its own right" (p. 174). "Childhood is not only a precursor and a means to the attainment of adult life. Childhood has its own interests" (p. 175). *"Every behavior interest is surrounded by a cognitive fringe. . . . It is this cognitive . . . fringe, and not the behavior, . . . which is the source of all the meaning which attaches to an object attended and responded to"* (p. 186).

But though democracy is faulty enough, we cannot abandon it. We must look forward to a combination of it with religion and idealism. "And such a . . . type of order surely is to be found nowhere except in . . . a community, a social and spiritual order" (p. 219). True, no doubt, but uninforming; the real question is, how shall we construct this community? Is it to be republican, monarchic, socialistic, or what? Unfortunately, we are not told. And is religion anything more than fervent social reconstruction? Dr. Adams says little if anything about God, the spirits, or aught but the "social problem." Religion is not allowed even a practical quality; it "will always bungle when it competes with the intelligent and the scientific control of life-processes and their environment" (p. 223). What is left but enthusi-

asm for the future social organism, such as might be shared by any atheistic socialist?

Thus after all, our author has not been able to move out of the magic circle of the subjective. The great Platonic idea of the community — what is it but the epitome of the needs of man, such as all pragmatists desire? No objective principles or ideals except this are mentioned; almost all of the book is concerned with epistemological controversy. Yet though he does not specify them, it is a good sign that he hints of ideals to be followed in the making of the perfect society, that he would right the over-balanced cultivation of activity, and that he defends, if in little more than name, the fundamental importance of religion for human progress.

Dr. Adams' diction is rather obscure, and his paragraphs as a rule lack unity. A Platonist should not use nouns as adjectives: e.g., "idea system," "knowledge situation," "behavior interest," etc. Nor should he employ the barbarous "due to" when he means "on account of" (p. 29). Examples, too long to quote here, of English which is no less than slovenly, are found on pp. 44, 59, 113, 166, 229.

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THE RELIGION OF NIETZSCHE. NIETZSCHE THE THINKER. A STUDY. WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Henry Holt & Co. 1917. Pp. x, 539. \$3.50.

The key to Nietzsche's theory of life, Mr. Salter thinks, is the conflict in his mind between piety and knowledge. "Being by nature and by force of early training reverent, finding, however, his religious faith undermined by science and by critical reflection, his problem came to be, how, consistently with science and the stern facts of life and the world, the old instincts of reverence might still have measurable satisfaction, and life again be lit up with a sense of transcendent things. He was at bottom a religious philosopher."

This observation, though not new, has never before been so clearly put, and with such a nice sense of the fact that whatever system and poise Nietzsche in thought attained rests upon a conflict of emotions that grew deeper and more tragic with the years. Neither of these facts seems, to most commentators upon Nietzsche, to have been of particular importance. They respond to his emotional qualities — the beat and rhythm of his style, the great hunger and dream-like gratifications in his ideas. They violently agree with him or they violently disagree with him, according as he lifts the lid or clamps it